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HOW TO DO THE HISTORY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALITY

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In the following essay, Halperin grapples with the difficulties of historiographical work on male homosexuality. Following Foucault, he performs a genealogical analysis of homosexuality in which he creates a flexible paradigm that accounts for the various discourses used to describe male sexual experience throughout Western history. He identifies and traces five different discursive traditions that have been used to describe non-normative sexuality. He begins with four "pre-homosexual" discursive categories: effeminacy, pederasty/sodomy, friendship/love, passivity/inversion, which all place emphasis on gender subversion. He then traces the transformation from "pre-homosexual" categories to the modern category of "homosexuality," which depends less on gender and more on individualization, normalization, and sexuality.

THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY is now such a respectable academic discipline, or at least such an established one, that its practitioners no longer feel much pressure to defend the enterprise—to rescue it from suspicions of being a palpable absurdity. Once upon a time, the very phrase "the history of sexuality" sounded like a contradiction in terms: how, after all, could sexuality have a history? Nowadays, by contrast, we are so accustomed to the notion that sexuality does indeed have a history that we do not often ask ourselves what kind of history sexuality has. If such questions do come up, they get dealt with cursorily, in the course of the methodological throat-clearing that historians ritually perform

in the opening paragraphs of scholarly articles. Recently, this exercise has tended to include a more or less obligatory reference to the trouble once caused to historians, long long ago in a country far far away, by theorists who had argued that sexuality was socially constructed—an intriguing idea in its time and place, or so we are reassuringly told, but one that was taken to outlandish extremes and that no one much credits any longer. With the disruptive potential of these metahistorical questions safely relegated to the past, the historian of sexuality can get down, or get back, to the business at hand.

But this new consensus, and the sense of theoretical closure that accompanies it, is premature. I believe that it is more useful than ever to ask how sexuality can have a history. The point of such a question, to be sure, is no longer to register the questioner's skepticism and incredulity (as if to say, "How on earth could such a thing be possible?") but to inquire more closely into the modalities of historical being that sexuality possesses: to ask how exactly—in what terms, by virtue of what temporality, in which of its dimensions or aspects—sexuality does have a history.

That question, of course, has already been answered in a number of ways, each of them manifesting a different strategy for articulating the relation between continuity and discontinuity, identity and difference, in the history of sexuality. The constructionist-essentialist debate of the late 1980s should be seen as a particularly vigorous effort to force a solution to this question, but even after constructionists claimed to have won the debate, and essentialists claimed to have exposed the bad scholarship produced by it, and everyone else claimed to be sick and tired of it, the basic question about the history of sexuality has remained. In fact, current work in the history of sexuality still appears to be poised in its emphasis between the two poles of identity and difference, which in my view represent merely reformulated versions of the old essentialist and constructionist positions. Nonetheless, it may be prudent to recast the question in less polemical or old-fashioned terms by acknowledging that any adequate attempt to describe the historicity of sexuality will have to fix on some strategy for accommodating the aspects of sexual life that seem to persist through time as well as the dramatic differences between historically documented forms of sexual experience. Current analytic models that attempt to do this by mapping shifts in the categories or classifications of an otherwise unchanging "sexuality," or by insisting on a historical distinction between premodern sexual acts and modern sexual identities, simply cannot capture the complexity of the issues at stake in the new histories of sexual subjectivity that are available to us.⁷

The tensions between interpretative emphases on continuity and discontinuity, identity and difference, appear with almost painful intensity in the historiography of homosexuality. They reflect not only the high political stakes in any contemporary project that involves producing representations of homosexuality but also the irreducible definitional uncertainty about what homosexuality itself really is.⁸ Perhaps the clearest and most explicit articulation of the consequences of this uncertainty for historians is found in the introduction to *Hidden from History*, the pathbreaking anthology of lesbian and gay history:

Same-sex genital sexuality, love and friendship, gender non-conformity, and a certain aesthetic or political perspective are all considered to have some (often ambiguous and always contested) relationship to that complex of attributes we today designate as homosexuality. . . . much historical research has been an effort to locate the antecedents of those characteristics a given historian believes are constitutive of contemporary gay identity, be they sodomitical acts, cross-dressing, or intimate friendships.

If contemporary gay or lesbian identity seems to hover in suspense between these different and discontinuous discourses of sodomy, gender inversion, and same-sex love, the same can

be said even more emphatically about homosexual identity as we attempt to trace it back in time. The essence of the constructionist approach to the history of homosexuality, after all, was to argue that homosexuality is a modern construction, not because no same sex sexual acts or erotic labels existed before 1869, when the term "homosexuality" first appeared in print, but because no single category of discourse or experience existed in the premodern and non Western worlds that comprehended exactly the same range of same sex sexual behaviors, desires, psychologies, and socialities, as well as the various forms of gender deviance, that now fall within the capacious definitional boundaries of homosexuality. Some earlier identity categories attached to same sex sexual practices occupied some of the discursive territory now claimed by homosexuality; others cut across the frontier between homosexuality and heterosexuality. A number of these identity categories persisted in various forms for thousands of years before the modern term or concept of homosexuality was invented. It is quite possible that the current definitional uncertainty about what homosexuality is, or the uncertainty about what features are constitutive of lesbian or gay male identity, is the result of this long historical process of accumulation, accretion, and overlay. The history of discourses pertaining to forms of *male* intimacy may be especially revealing, because such discourses have been extensively and complexly elaborated over time, and they condense a number of the crosscutting systems of thought at whose intersection we now find ourselves.

In what follows I offer what I believe is a new strategy for approaching the history of sexuality in general and the history of male homosexuality in particular. My strategy is designed to rehabilitate a modified constructionist approach to the history of sexuality by readily acknowledging the existence of transhistorical continuities but refraining them within a genealogical analysis of (homo)sexuality itself. I begin where we must all begin (like it or not), namely, with the modern concept of homosexuality, which, explicitly or implicitly, defines the horizons of our immediate understanding and inevitably shapes our inquiries into same sex sexual desire and behavior in the past. If we cannot simply escape from the conceptual tyranny of homosexuality by some feat of scholarly rigor—by an insistent methodological suspension of modern categories, by an austere historicist determination to identify and bracket our own ideological presuppositions so as to describe earlier phenomena in all their irreducible cultural specificity and time bound purity—we can at least watch our modern definitions of homosexuality dissolve as we attempt to trace them backward in time. A genealogical analysis of homosexuality, in other words, begins with our contemporary notion of homosexuality, incoherent though it may be, not only because such a notion frames our inquiry into same sex sexual expression in the past but also because it contains within itself genetic traces, as it were, of its own historical evolution. In fact, the very incoherence at the core of the modern notion of homosexuality furnishes the most eloquent indication of the historical accumulation of discontinuous notions sheltered within its specious unity. The genealogist attempts to disaggregate those notions by tracing their separate histories as well as the process of their interrelations, their crossings, and, eventually, their unstable convergence in the present day.

That is what I will make a preliminary attempt to do here. I want to describe, very tentatively, some important prehomosexual discourses, practices, categories, patterns, or models (I am really not sure what to call them) and to sketch their similarities with and differences from what goes by the name of homosexuality nowadays. To do this, I need to be as systematic as I can; that is, I need to distinguish those earlier, prehomosexual traditions of homosexual discourse both from one another and from the modern discourses of homosexuality even as I note overlaps or commonalities among them. This means that I must describe these various categories in all their positivity and build as much specificity as I can into each of them while also accounting for their interrelations. My aim is to capture the play of identities and differences *within* the synchronic multiplicity of different but simultaneous

traditions of discourse that have existed through the ages as well as the play of identities and differences across the diachronic transition effected during the last three or four centuries by the emergence of the discourses of (homo)sexuality.

Let me not exaggerate my originality. Previous historians and sociologists have identified four principal models according to which same-sex sexual behaviors are culturally constructed around the world (age-differentiated, role-specific, gender-crossing, and homosexual), and these four models reveal some obvious correspondences with the categories employed in the genealogy of male homosexuality outlined here.⁵ My own approach is distinguished, I believe, by being explicitly genealogical rather than sociological (or even, in a strict sense, historical) and by making visible a series of discursive figures immanent in the social and cultural traditions of Europe in particular. (I focus here on the history of European discourses, because I am attempting to construct the genealogy of a European notion—that is, homosexuality—but I include non-European material in my survey whenever it seems pertinent.) My most immediate precursors, it turns out, are the editors of *Hidden from History* quoted above: the three models of homosexuality that they enumerate—"same-sex genital sexuality" or "sodomitical acts," "love and friendship" or "indimate friendships," and "gender non-conformity" or "cross-dressing"—closely anticipate the divisions I make here.

I will argue, in any case, that there is no such thing as a history of male homosexuality. At least, there is no such thing as a singular or unitary history of male homosexuality. Instead, there are histories of at least four different but simultaneous categories or traditions of discourse pertaining to aspects of what we now define as homosexuality. Each of these traditions has its own consistency, autonomy, density, particularity, and continuity over time. Each has subsisted more or less independently of the others, although they have routinely interacted with one another, and they have helped constitute one another through their various exclusions. Their separate histories as well as the history of their interrelations have been obscured but not superseded by the recent emergence of the discourses of (homo)sexuality. In fact, what *homosexuality* signifies today is an effect of this cumulative process of historical overlay and accretion. One result of that historical process is what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick memorably calls "the unrationalized coexistence of different models" of sex and gender in the present day.⁶ I believe I am now in a position to offer, as a hypothesis, a historical explanation for the phenomenon that Sedgwick has so brilliantly described. I suggest that if our "understanding of homosexual definition . . . is organized around a radical and irreducible incoherence" (85), owing to "the unrationalized coexistence of different models" of sex and gender, it is because we have retained at least four prehomosexual models of male sexual and gender deviance, all of which derive from a premodern system that privileges gender over sexuality, alongside of (and despite their flagrant conflict with) a more recent homosexual model derived from a modern system that privileges sexuality over gender. If that causal explanation is correct, then a genealogy of contemporary homosexual discourse—which is to say, a *historical* critique of the category of homosexuality, such as I propose to undertake here—can significantly support and expand Sedgwick's influential *discursive* critique of the category of homosexuality in *Epistemology of the Closet* and give it the historical grounding that Sedgwick's critique has, until now, signally lacked.⁷

The four prehomosexual categories of male sex and gender deviance that I have identified so far can be described, very provisionally, as categories of (1) effeminacy, (2) pederasty or "active" sodomy, (3) friendship or male love, and (4) passivity or inversion. A fifth category, the category of homosexuality, is—despite occasional prefigurations in earlier discourses—a modern addition. Each requires a separate analysis. I will concentrate on the history of discourses, because my project is to explore the genealogy of the modern discourses of homosexuality, but, as will become evident, I do not mean to exclude the history of practices, whose relation to the history of discourses remains to be fully considered.

Let me emphasize at the outset that the names I have chosen for the first four of these categories are heuristic, tentative, and ad hoc. My designations are not proper historical descriptors—how could they be, since the first four categories cut across historical periods, geographies, and cultures? Nor will my definitions of the first four categories explicate the historical meanings of those terms. For example, *sodomy*, “that utterly confused category,”⁹⁸ was applied historically to masturbation, oral sex, anal sex, and same-sex sexual relations, among other things, but my second category refers to something much more specific—not because I am unaware of the plurality of historical meanings of *sodomy* but because I use the term *active sodomy* specifically to denominate a certain model or structure of male homosexual relations for which there is no single proper name. That is unfortunate, but for the moment I see no alternative. With that as a final warning, let me now begin.

Effeminacy has often functioned as a marker of so-called sexual inversion in men, of transgenderism or sexual role reversal, and thus of homosexual desire. Nonetheless, it is useful to distinguish it from male passivity, inversion, and homosexuality. In particular, effeminacy should be clearly distinguished from homosexual object choice or same-sex sexual preference in men—and not just for the well-known reasons that it is possible for men to be effeminate without being homosexual and to be homosexual without being effeminate. Rather, effeminacy deserves to be treated independently because it was for a long time defined as a symptom of an excess of what we would call *heterosexual* as well as homosexual desire. It is therefore a category unto itself.

Effeminacy has not always implied homosexuality. In various European cultural traditions men could be designated as “soft” or “unmasculine” (*malthakos* in Greek, *mollis* in Latin and its Romance derivatives) either because they were inverters or pathics—because they were *womanly*, or transgendered, and liked being fucked by other men—or because, on the contrary, they were *womanizers*, because they deviated from masculine gender norms insofar as they preferred the soft option of love to the hard option of war. In the culture of the military elites of Europe, at least from the ancient world through the Renaissance, normative masculinity often entailed austerity, resistance to appetite, and mastery of the impulse to pleasure. (The once fashionable American ideal of the Big Man on Campus, the football jock who gets to indulge limitlessly his love of hot showers, cold beer, fast cars, and faster women, would appear in this context not as an emblem of masculinity but of its degraded opposite, as a monster of effeminacy.) A man displayed his true mettle in war, or so it was thought, and more generally in struggles with other men for honor—in politics, business, and other competitive enterprises. Those men who refused to rise to the challenge, who abandoned the competitive society of men for the amorous society of women, who pursued a life of pleasure, who made love instead of war—they incarnated the classical stereotype of effeminacy. This stereotype seems to live on in the American South, where “a redneck queer” is defined as “a boy from Alabama who laks girls better’n football.”⁹⁹ It is also alive and well in Anglo-Celtic Australia, where a real bloke is a guy who avoids the company of women and prefers to spend all his time with his mates (that’s how you can tell he’s straight).

This stereotype, which sorts out rather oddly with modern notions of hetero- and homosexuality, goes far back in time. For the ancient Greeks and Romans, a man who indulged his taste for sexual pleasure with women did not necessarily enhance his virility but often undermined it. To please women, such a man was likely to make an effort to appear smooth instead of rough, graceful instead of powerful, and might even compound that effeminate style by using makeup and perfumes, elaborate grooming, and prominent jewelry. In a late antique dialogue ascribed to Lucian, which features a debate between two men as to whether women or boys are better vehicles of male erotic pleasure, it is the advocate of boys who is portrayed as hypervirile, whereas the defender of women, a good-looking young man, is described as exhibiting “a skillful use of cosmetics, so as to be attractive to women.”¹⁰⁰

Similarly, the stereotype of an adulterer in the ancient Greek literary tradition can be judged from the following description in a romance by the Greek prose writer Chariton: "His hair was gleaming and heavily scented; his eyes were made up; he had a soft cloak and fine shoes; heavy rings gleamed on his fingers."¹¹ Effeminacy has traditionally functioned as a marker of heterosexual excess in men.

It seems that men liked other men to be rough and tough. They may have liked their women and boys to be soft and smooth, but they did not respect these qualities in a mature man. Women, by contrast, seem to have found the soft style of masculinity more appealing. This created a certain tension between gender norms and erotic life for men. The paradigmatic instance, which illustrates the traditional clash between hard and soft styles of masculinity, can be found in the figure of Hercules. Hercules is a hero who oscillates between extremes of hyper-masculinity and effeminacy: he is preternaturally strong, yet he finds himself enslaved by a woman (Queen Omphale); he surpasses all men at feats of strength, yet he is driven mad by love, either for a woman (Iole) or for a boy (Hylas).¹² Hercules sets the stage for such modern figures as Shakespeare's Mark Antony, who claims Hercules as his literal ancestor in *Antony and Cleopatra* and who incurs similar charges of effeminacy when he takes time out from ruling the Roman Empire to live a life of passion and indulgence with Cleopatra. The roles of ruler and lover are made to contrast from the very opening of the play, when Antony is described as "the triple pillar of the world transform'd / Into a stum-pet's foot" (1.1.12-13). Antony is not unique in Shakespeare. Othello also voices anxieties about the incapacitating effects of conjugal love on a military leader. But this tension is best represented by Shakespeare's Romeo, who, berating himself for a lack of martial ardor and invoking the traditional opposition between the cold, wet melancholia of love and the hot, dry nature of masculine virtue, exclaims:

O sweet Juliet,
Thy beauty hath made me effeminate,
And in my temper softened valour's steel!
(3.1.113-15)¹³

The survival and interplay of these different notions of effeminacy may help explain the persistent sexual ambiguity that attaches, even today, to predominantly male institutions, such as fraternities, the armed forces, the church, the corporate boardroom, Congress: a sort of manhood fostered and expressed there to be considered the truest and most essential form of masculinity, or an exceptional and bizarre perversion of it?

In short, effeminacy needs to be distinguished from homosexuality. This brings me to the second prehomosexual category: pederasty or "active" sodomy. These terms refer to the male sexual penetration of a subordinate male—subordinate in terms of age, social class, gender style, and/or sexual role. The discourses of pederasty or "active" sodomy are shaped by a crucial distinction between the male desire to penetrate and the male desire to be penetrated, and thus between pederasty or sodomy, on the one hand, and male passivity or inversion, on the other. The contrast between these two is reflected in my differentiation here between the second and the fourth of the five categories.

The nineteenth-century sexologists who systematically elaborated the distinction between pederasty ("Greek love") and passivity ("contrary sexual feeling" or "inversion of the sexual instinct") based it on an even more fundamental distinction between pederasty and inversion, according to which an inverted, transgendered, or passive sexual orientation always indicated perversion in a man, whereas the sexual penetration of a subordinate male might qualify merely as perversity. These Victorian medical writers, who were still largely untouched by the distinction between homo- and heterosexual (which had yet to assert its

ascendancy over earlier modes of sexual classification), were chiefly interested in determining whether deviant sexual acts proceeded from an individual's morally depraved character (perversity)—whether, that is, they were merely the result of vice, which might be restrained by laws and punished as a crime—or whether they originated in a pathological condition (perversion), a mental disease, a perverted “sexuality,” which could only be medically treated. The distinction is expounded by Krafft-Ebing as follows:

Perversion of the sexual instinct . . . is not to be confounded with perversity in the sexual act; since the latter may be induced by conditions other than psychopathological. The concrete perverse act, monstrous as it may be, is clinically not decisive. In order to differentiate between disease (perversion) and vice (perversity), one must investigate the whole personality of the individual and the original motive leading to the perverse act. Therein will be found the key to the diagnosis.¹⁴

The male sexual penetration of a subordinate male certainly represented a perverse act, but it might not in every case signify a perversion of the sexual instinct, a mental illness affecting “the whole personality”; it might indicate a morally vicious character rather than a pathological condition.

Implicit in this doctrine was the premise that there was not necessarily anything sexually or psychologically abnormal in itself about the male sexual penetration of a subordinate male. If the man who played an “active” sexual role in sexual intercourse with other males was conventionally masculine in both his appearance and his manner of feeling and acting, if he did not seek to be penetrated by other men, and/or if he also had sexual relations with women, he might not be sick but immoral, not perverted but merely perverse. His penetration of a subordinate male, reprehensible and abominable though it might be, could be reckoned a manifestation of his excessive but otherwise normal male sexual appetite. Like the somewhat earlier, aristocratic figure of the libertine or rake or roué,¹⁵ such a man perversely refused to limit his sexual options to pleasures supposedly prescribed by nature and instead sought out more unusual, unlawful, sophisticated, or elaborate sexual experiences to gratify his jaded sexual tastes. In the case of such men, pederasty or sodomy was a sign of an immoral character but not of a personality disorder, “moral insanity,” or psychological abnormality.¹⁶

The sexologists' distinction between the perverse and the perverted, between the immoral and the pathological, the merely vicious and the diseased, may strike us as quaintly Victorian, but prominent psychologists, sociologists, and jurists today draw similar distinctions between “pseudohomosexuality” and “homosexuality” or between “situational,” “opportunistic” homosexuality and what they call, for lack of a better term, “real” homosexuality.¹⁷ The acts of homosexual penetration performed in prison by men who lead heterosexual lives out of prison, for example, are often regarded not as symptoms of a particular psychosexual orientation, as expressions of erotic desire, or even as “homosexuality,” but as mere behavioral adaptations by men to a society without women. Such behavior, it is often believed nowadays, simply vouches for the male capacity to enjoy various forms of perverse gratification¹⁸ and, further, to eroticize hierarchy, to be sexually aroused by the opportunity to play a dominant role in structured relations of unequal power.

The distinction between pederasty and sexual inversion that I have derived from nineteenth century psychiatry and that persists today did not originate in the Victorian period. Rather, it reflects an age-old practice of classifying sexual relations in terms of penetration versus being penetrated, superordinate versus subordinate status, masculinity versus femininity, activity versus passivity—in terms of *hierarchy and gender*, that is, rather than in

terms of *sex and sexuality*. Possible evidence for an age-structured, role specific, hierarchical pattern of sexual relations among males can be found in the Mediterranean basin as early as the Bronze Age civilizations of Minoan Crete in the late second millennium BC⁵⁹ and as late as the Renaissance cities of Italy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries AD. The best-known and most thoroughly documented historical instances of this pattern are probably ancient Greek and Roman pederasty and early modern European sodomy, but the pattern itself seems to have preexisted them, and it also has outlived them.

The evidence from judicial records in fifteenth-century Florence is sufficiently detailed to afford us a glimpse of the extent and distribution of sodomitical activity in one (admittedly notorious) premodern European community. Between 1432 and 1502 as many as seventeen thousand individuals in Florence, most of them males, were formally incriminated at least once for sodomy, out of a total population of forty thousand men, women, and children: two out of every three men who reached the age of forty in this period were formally incriminated for sodomy. Among those who were indicted, approximately 90 percent of the "passive" partners (including, according to Florentine notions, the insertive partners in oral copulation as well as the receptive partners in anal intercourse) were eighteen or younger, and 93 percent of the "active" partners were nineteen or older—the vast majority of them under the ages of thirty-five, the time of life at which men customarily married.⁶⁰

This is sex as hierarchy, not mutually, sex as something done to someone by someone else, not a common search for shared pleasure or a purely personal, private experience in which larger social identities based on age or social status are submerged or lost. Here sex implies difference, not identity, and it turns on a systematic division of labor. It is the younger partner who is considered sexually attractive, while it is the older one who experiences erotic desire for the younger. Although love, emotional intimacy, and tenderness are not necessarily absent from the relationship, the distribution of erotic passion and sexual pleasure is assumed to be more or less lopsided, with the older, "active" partner being the *subject* of desire and the recipient of the greater share of pleasure from a younger partner who figures as a sexual *object*, feels no comparable desire, and derives no comparable pleasure from the contact (unless he is an invert or pathic and therefore belongs to my fourth category). The junior partner's reward must therefore be measured out in other currencies than pleasure, such as praise, assistance, gifts, or money. As an erotic experience, pederasty or sodomy refers to the "active" partner only.⁶¹

This traditional, hierarchical model of male sexual relations represents sexual preference without sexual orientation. Numbers of texts going back to classical antiquity testify to a conscious erotic preference on the part of men, even to the point of exclusivity, for sexual intercourse with members of one sex rather than the other;⁶² indeed, a venerable subgenre of erotic literature consists of formal debates between two men about whether women or boys are superior vehicles of male sexual gratification. Such playful debates are widely distributed in the luxury literatures of traditional male societies: examples can be found in Greek prose works from late antiquity, in medieval European and Arabic poetry and prose, in late imperial Chinese writings, and in the literary productions of the "floating world"—the sophisticated literature of town life in seventeenth-century Japan.⁶³

But the explicit and conscious erotic preferences voiced in such contexts should not be equated with declarations of sexual orientation, for at least three reasons. First, they are presented as the outcome of conscious choice, a choice that expresses the male subject's values and preferred way of life, rather than as symptoms of an involuntary psychosexual condition. The men who voice such preferences often see themselves as at least nominally capable of responding to the erotic appeal of both good-looking women and good-looking boys. This is sexual object choice as an expression of ethics or aesthetics, as an exercise in erotic connoisseurship, not as a reflex of sexuality. It is more like vegetarianism than

homosexuality. Second, same sex sexual object choice in and of itself does not necessarily function in this context as a marker of difference. It does not individuate men from one another in terms of their "sexuality." Finally, same sex sexual object choice in this case does not mark itself visibly on a man's physical appearance or inscribe itself in his personal mannerisms or deportment. Nor does it impugn his masculinity.²⁴

Nonetheless, pederasty or sodomy did provide a means for men to express and discuss their sexual tastes, to explore their erotic subjectivities, and to compare their sexual preferences. It is in the context of erotic reflection by socially empowered, superordinate, conventionally masculine males that men have been able to articulate conscious erotic preferences, sometimes to the point of exclusivity, for sexual relations with boys or women, as well as for sexual relations with certain kinds of boys or women. The highly elaborate, ritualistic, conspicuously public practice of courtship and lovemaking provided socially empowered males with a traditional, socially sanctioned discursive space for articulating such preferences and for presenting themselves as conscious *subjects of desire*.

This point is an important one for historians, and it has long been obscured. John Boswell, who influentially defined as "gay sexuality" all same-sex "eroticism associated with a conscious preference," thought that if he could find evidence in premodern Europe of conscious erotic preference by one male for another, he would have documented the existence of gay sexuality in that period as well.²⁵ Of course, evidence of conscious erotic preferences does exist in abundance, but it tends to be found in the context of discourses linked to the senior partners in hierarchical relations of pederasty or sodomy. It therefore points not to the existence of gay sexuality per se but to one particular discourse and set of practices constituting one aspect of gay sexuality as we currently define it. Declarations of conscious erotic preferences are rarely, if ever, to be found in the contexts of the three other traditional discourses of male same-sex eroticism and gender deviance discussed here. And so conscious same-sex erotic preference ought not be equated with the whole of gay sexuality or male homosexuality. It represents merely one historical tradition among several.²⁶

Far removed from the hierarchical world of the sexual penetration of subordinate males by superordinate males is the world of male friendship and love, which can claim an equally ancient discursive tradition. To be sure, hierarchy is not always absent from social relations between male friends: from the heroic comradeships of Gilgamesh and Enkidu in the Babylonian *Epic of Gilgamesh*, David and Jonathan in the biblical Books of Samuel, and Achilles and Patroclus in the *Iliad* to the latest American biracial cop thriller, male friendships often reveal striking patterns of asymmetry.²⁷ Precisely to the extent, however, that such friendships are structured by social divisions or by inequalities of power, to the extent that they approximate patron-client relationships in which the two "friends" are assigned radically different duties, postures, and roles, to just that extent are such friendships opened up to the possibility of being interpreted, then as now, in pederastic or sodomitical terms.²⁸ Within the horizons of the male world, as we have seen, hierarchy itself is *hot*: it is indissociably bound up with at least the potential for erotic signification. Hence disparities of power between male intimates take on an immediate and inescapable aura of eroticism. No wonder, then, that three and four centuries after the composition of the *Iliad*, some Greeks of the classical period interpreted Achilles and Patroclus as a pederastic couple (although they could not always agree who was the man and who was the boy), while more recently scholars have disputed whether David and Jonathan were lovers. Such disputes, which often have a long history, tend to conflate notions of friendship with notions of erotic hierarchy or sodomy and with notions of homosexuality. It may be useful therefore to distinguish friendship both from erotic hierarchy and from homoerotic desire.

It should be noted that in addition to the tradition of the heroic warrior with his subordinate male pal or sidekick (who inevitably dies), in addition to the patron-client model of

male friendship, there is another tradition that emphasizes equality, mutuality, and reciprocity in love between men. Such an egalitarian relation can obtain only between two men who occupy the same social rank, usually an elite one, and who can claim the same status in terms of age, masculinity, and social empowerment. In the eighth and ninth books of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle championed precisely such a reciprocal model of friendship between male equals, and he wrote, most influentially, that the best sort of friend is "another self," an *alios autos* or alter ego (9.4 [1166a31]). The sentiment is echoed repeatedly through the centuries: a true friend is part of oneself, indistinguishable from oneself. True friends have a single mind, a single heart in two bodies. As Montaigne writes in his essay "On Friendship," "Our souls mingle and blend with each other so completely that they efface the seam that joined them, and cannot find it again."²⁹ The friendship of virtuous men is characterized by a disinterested love that leads to a merging of individual identities and hence to an unwillingness to live without the other, a readiness to die with or for the other. We find the theme of the inseparability of male friends in both life and death repeated time and again from representations of Achilles and Patroclus, Orestes and Pylades, Theseus and Pirithous in the ancient world to *Lethal Weapon*'s Mel Gibson and Danny Glover in the modern world.

The language used to convey such passionate male unions often appears to modern sensibilities suspiciously overheated, if not downright erotic. Thus Montaigne can write:

If you press me to tell why I loved him, I feel that this cannot be expressed, except by answering: Because it was he, because it was I. . . . it is I know not what. . . which, having seized my whole will, led it to plunge and lose itself in his; which, having seized his whole will, led it to plunge and lose itself in mine, with equal hunger, equal rivalry. I say lose, in truth, for neither of us reserved anything for himself, nor was anything either his or mine. . . . Our souls pulled together in such union, they regarded each other with such ardent affection, and with a like affection revealed themselves to each other to the very depths of our hearts, that not only did I know his soul as well as mine, but I should certainly have trusted myself to him more readily than to myself.³⁰

Similarly, in a 1677 drama on a Roman theme by Dryden, *All for Love*, Antony can say about his noble friend Dolabella:

I was his soul, he lived not but in me.
We were so closed within each other's breasts,
The rivets were not found that joined us first.
That does not reach us yet: we were so mixed
As meeting streams, both to ourselves were lost;
We were one mass; we could not give or take
But from the same, for he was I, I he.

(3.90-96)

It is difficult for us moderns, with our heavily psychological model of the human personality, of conscious and unconscious desire, and our heightened sensitivity to anything that might seem to contravene the strict protocols of heterosexual masculinity, to avoid reading into such passionate expressions of male love a suggestion of "homosexuality" at the very least, if not of "latent homosexuality"—formulations that often act as a cover for our own perplexity about how to interpret the evidence before us. But quite apart from the difficulty of entering into the emotional lives of premodern subjects, we need to reckon with the discursive

contexts in which such passionate declarations were produced. The thematic insistence on mutuality and the merging of individual identities, although it may invoke in the minds of modern readers the formulas of heterosexual romantic love (e.g., Cathy's "I am Heathcliff"), in fact situates avowals of reciprocal love between male friends in an honorable, even glamorous tradition of heroic comradeship: precisely by banishing any hint of subordination on the part of one friend to the other, and thus any suggestion of hierarchy, the emphasis on the fusion of two souls into one actually distances such a love from erotic passion. Montaigne never betrays the slightest doubt, in writing about his love for Etienne de La Boétie, that the sentiments he expresses are entirely normative, even admirable and boastworthy (although of course unique in their specifics). Far from offering us clues to his psychopathology, inadvertently revealing to us traces of his suppressed or unconscious desires or expressing his erotic peculiarities (something he freely does elsewhere in his *Essays*), Montaigne seems to have understood that the account of friendship he offers would be immune to disreputable interpretation, in part because his love is so elaborately presented as egalitarian, nonhierarchical, and reciprocal. For by that means he detaches it from the erotic realms of difference and hierarchy, setting it explicitly *against* the sexual love of men and women as well as the male sexual enjoyment of boys.

Sexual love, at least as it is viewed within the cultural horizons of the male world, is all about penetration and therefore all about position, superiority and inferiority, rank and status, gender and difference. Friendship, by contrast, is all about sameness: sameness of rank and status, sameness of sentiment, sameness of identity. It is this very emphasis on identity, similarity, and mutuality that distances the friendship tradition, in its original social and discursive context, from the world of sexual love. So why include it here, in a genealogy of male homosexuality? Because the friendship tradition provided socially empowered men with an established discursive venue in which to express, without social reproach, sentiments of passionate and mutual love for one another, and such passionate, mutual love between persons of the same sex is an important component of what we now call homosexuality.

Both pederasty/sodomy and friendship/love are consonant with masculine gender norms, with conventional masculinity as it has been defined in a number of European cultures. If anything, pederasty and friendship are both traditionally masculinizing, insofar as they express the male subject's virility and imply a thoroughgoing rejection of everything that is feminine. Both can therefore be seen as consolidating male gender identity (although not, of course, in every instance). As such, they belong to a different conceptual, moral, and social universe from what the Greeks called *kinaidia*, the Romans *mollitia*, and the nineteenth-century sexologists "contrary sexual feeling" or "sexual inversion." All these terms refer to the male "inversion" or reversal of masculine gender identity, a wholesale surrender of masculinity in favor of femininity, a transgendered condition expressed in everything from personal comportment and style to physical appearance, manner of feeling, sexual attraction to "normal" men, and preference for a receptive or "passive" role in sexual intercourse with such men.

The mere fact of being sexually penetrated by a man is much less significant for the sexual classification of passives or inverts than the question of the penetrated male's pleasure. In the premodern systems of pederasty and sodomy, boys do not derive much pleasure from the sexual act: they are the more or less willing objects of adult male desire, but they are not conventionally assigned a share of desire equal to that of their senior male partners, nor are they expected to enjoy being penetrated by them. Although they are "passive" in terms of their behavior, then, they are not passive in their overall erotic temperament or attitude: they are not aroused by the prospect or the act of submission. They have to be motivated to submit to their male lovers by a variety of largely nonsexual inducements, such as gifts or threats. So their "passivity" does not extend to their desire, which remains unengaged and can

therefore claim to be uncontaminated by any impulse to subordination, any hint of "femininity." *Kinaiōi* (in Latin) and *inverti*, by contrast, actively desire to submit their bodies "passively" to sexual penetration by men, and in this sense they are seen as having a woman's desire, subjectivity, and gender identity. The category of male passive or invert applies specifically to subordinate males whose willingness to submit themselves to sexual penetration by men proceeds not from some nonsexual motive but from their own erotic desires and/or from their assumption of a feminine gender identity.

Although the pleasure he takes in being sexually penetrated may be the most flagrant, inversion is not necessarily, or even principally, defined by the enjoyment of particular sexual acts. Nor does it have to do strictly with homosexual desire, because *inverti* may have insertive phallic sex with women without ceasing to be considered *inverti*. Rather, inversion has to do with deviant gender identity, sensibility, and personal style, one aspect of which is the "womanly" liking for a passive role in sexual intercourse with other men. Therefore notions of inversion do not tend to make a strict separation between specifically sexual manifestations of inversion and other, equally telling deviations from the norms of masculinity, such as the adoption of feminine dress. The emphasis falls on a violation of the protocols of manhood, a characterological failure of grand proportions that cannot be redeemed (as sodomy can) by the enjoyment of sexual relations with women. Inversion is not about sexuality but about gender.¹²

What, then, is the difference between *effeminate* and *passive*? What distinguishes those men (belonging to my first category) who affect a "soft" style of masculinity and prefer making love to making war from those men (belonging to this fourth category) who have *effeminate* manners and wish to submit their bodies, in "womanly" fashion, to the phallic pleasures of other men? The distinction is a subtle one, and it is easily blurred. After all, some stigma of gender deviance, of *effemacy*, applies to both types of men. And polarized definitions of the masculine and the feminine, along with the hyperbolic nature of sexual stereotyping, enable the slightest suggestion of gender deviance to be quickly inflated and transformed into an accusation of complete and total gender treason. From *liking* women to wanting to be *like* women is, according to the phobic logic of this masculinist ideology, only a small step—which is why both *effeminate* and *passive* ("pathic") can be characterized as "soft" or unmasculine. The common application of the vocabulary of gender deviance to both *effeminate* and *passive* complicates for the modern interpreter the problem of distinguishing them.

(One way to describe the difference between *effeminate* and *passive* is to contrast a universalizing notion of gender deviance with a minimizing one. "Softness" either may represent the specter of potential gender failure that haunts all normative masculinity, an ever present threat to the masculinity of every man, or it may represent the disfiguring peculiarity of a small class of deviant individuals. "Effeminate" are men who succumb to a tendency that all normal men have and that all normal men have to guard against or suppress in themselves, whereas *passive* are men who are so unequal to the struggle that they can be seen to suffer from a specific constitutional defect, namely, a lack of the masculine capacity to withstand the appeal of pleasure deemed exceptionally disgraceful or degrading) as well as a tendency to adopt a specifically feminine attitude of surrender in relations with other men.

It is these features that define the *invert*, even more than his desire or his sexual object choice, because the latter are not unique to him. The desire for a male partner, for example, is something the *invert* has in common both with the *pederast* and with the heroic friend, figures vastly removed from him in social and moral status. Inversion also differs from *pederasty* and friendship in that the love of boys and the love of friends are not

necessarily discreditable sentiments, and they may well be confessed or even championed by the subjects themselves, whereas inversion is a shameful condition, never proclaimed about oneself, almost always ascribed to some other by an accuser whose intent is to demean and to vilify.

Moreover, traditional representations of "active" pederasts or sodomites do not necessarily portray them as visibly different in their appearance from normal men. You can't always tell a pederast or sodomite by looking at him. An invert, by contrast, usually stands out, because his reversal of his gender identity affects his personal demeanor and shapes his attitude, gestures, and manner of conducting himself. Unlike the active penetration of boys, which might differentiate the lover of boys from the lover of women in terms of erotic preference but may not mark him as a visibly different sort of person, passivity or inversion stamps itself all over a man's social presentation and identifies him as a spectacularly deviant social type. It is in the context of inversion that we most often find produced and elaborated representations of a peculiar character type or stereotype, a phobic caricature embodying the supposedly visible and flagrant features of male sexual and gender deviance. Although this type is attached to homosexual sex, it is not attached to homosexual sex absolutely, for it is connected much less regularly, if at all, with pederasty or "active" sodomy; rather, it seems to be associated with passive or receptive homosexual sex, seen as merely one aspect of a more generalized gender reversal, an underlying betrayal of masculinity.⁵⁴ There is a remarkably consistent emphasis throughout the history of European sexual representation on the deviant morphology of the invert, his visibly different mode of appearance and dress, his feminine style of self-presentation. Inversion manifests itself outwardly.

It doesn't take one to know one. Everybody seems to know what an invert looks like and how he behaves, even if no normal man could possibly impersonate one. As a character in an ancient Greek comedy says, "I have absolutely no idea how to use a twittering voice or walk about in an effeminate style, with my head tilted sidewise like all those pathics that I see here in the city smeared with depilatories."⁵⁵ Similarly, the Roman orator Quintilian speaks of "the plucked body, the broken walk, the female attire" as "signs of one who is *mollis* [soft] and not a real man."⁵⁶ Ancient physiognomists, experts in the learned technique of deciphering a person's character from his or her appearance, provide a more detailed description of the type:

You may recognize him by his provocatively melting glance and by the rapid movement of his intensely staring eyes. His brow is furrowed while his eyebrows and cheeks are in constant motion. His head is tilted to the side, his loins do not hold still, and his slack limbs never stay in one position. He minces along with little jumping steps; his knees knock together. He carries his hands with palms turned upward. He has a shifting gaze, and his voice is thin, weepy, shrill, and drawling.⁵⁷

All attempts at concealment are useless: "For it is by the twitching of their lips and the rotation of their eyes, by the haphazard and inconsistent shifting of their feet, by the movement of their hips and the fickle motion of their hands, and by the tremor of their voice as it begins with difficulty to speak, that effeminate are most easily revealed."⁵⁸

But the ability to unmask an invert is hardly limited to specialist gender detectives. The Roman leader Scipio Aemilianus, consul in 147 BC and censor in 142, had no difficulty branding an opponent with all the telltale signs: "For the kind of man who adorns himself daily in front of a mirror, wearing perfume; whose eyebrows are shaved off; who walks around with plucked beard and thighs; who when he was a young man reclined at banquets next to his lover, wearing a long sleeved tunic; who is as fond of men as he is of wine: can

anyone doubt that he has done what *cinædi* are in the habit of doing?"¹⁹ The unmentionable deed of the *cinædi*, of course, is passive bodily penetration.

The particular markers of inversion may be culture-bound and therefore susceptible to change over time, but the legibility of inversion is one of its perennial features. The medieval and early modern "catamite" (a word sometimes presumed, on the basis of dubious etymological reasoning, to signify the passive partner of a sodomite) is another highly "overt" type, and he seems little more than a *cinædus* got up in medieval dress. Here, for example, is a retrospective account of the goings-on at the court of the English king William Rufus, at the turn of the twelfth century, by a monastic chronicler named Orderic Vitalis:

At that time effeminate set the fashion in many parts of the world: foul catamites, doomed to eternal fire, unrestainedly pursued their revels and shamelessly gave themselves up to the filth of sodomy. They rejected the traditions of honest men, ridiculed the counsel of priests, and persisted in their barbarous way of life and style of dress. They parted their hair from the crown of the head to the forehead, grew long and luxurious locks like women, and loved to deck themselves in long, over-tight shirts and tunics.²⁰

From here it is a small step to the Renaissance court of the French king Henri III, where in July 1576 one observer, commenting indignantly on the "effeminate, lewd make-up and adornments" of the king's *mignons*—mignons, or darlings (a synonym for "catamite")—remarked that "these fine *mignons* wear their hair long, curled and recurled by means of artifice, with little velvet bonnets on top of it, like the whores of the brothels."²¹ A century and a half later Londoners painted a vivid portrait of the "mollies," the effeminate men who gathered privately in certain taverns called "molly houses." Samuel Stevens, a religious crusader for the reformation of morals, furnished a description in November 1725:

I found between 40 and 50 men making love to one another, as they called it. Sometimes they would sit in one another's laps, kissing in a lewd manner and using their hands indecently. Then they would get up, dance and make curtsies, and mimic the voices of women. . . . Then they would hug, and play, and toy, and go out by couples into another room on the same floor to be married, as they called it.

Another firsthand account of a molly house includes a description of a costume ball held there:

The men [were] calling one another "my dear" and hugging, kissing, and tickling each other as if they were a mixture of wanton males and females, and assuming effeminate voices and airs. . . . Some were completely rigged in gowns, petticoats, headcloths, fine laced shoes, turblowed scarves, and masks; some had riding hoods; some were dressed like milkmaids, others like shepherdeses with green hats, waistcoats, and petticoats; and others had their faces patched and painted and wore very extensive hoop petticoats, which had been very lately introduced.²²

A literary echo of this stereotype can be found in the figure of Captain Whiffle, in Tobias Smollett's novel *Roderick Random* (1748). But it is a character in John Cleland's *Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure* (also 1748) who makes this traditional point in terms that look forward to

the pathologizing discourses of the modern era. There is, she says, "a plague spot visibly imprinted on all that are tainted" with this passion.⁴¹

For it was precisely this visibly disfigured victim of erotic malignancy who provided neurologists and psychiatrists in the latter part of the nineteenth century with the clinical basis for the first systematic scientific conceptualization and definition of pathological (or perverted) sexual orientation. In August 1869, the same year that witnessed the first printed appearance of the word "homosexuality," Karl Friedrich Otto Westphal, a German expert on "the diseases of the nerves" or "nervous system," published an article on "contrary sexual feeling" or "sensibility" [*conträre Sexualempfindung*], which he presented as a symptom of a neuropathic or psychopathic condition.⁴² Specialists continued to argue over the proper scientific designation for this condition, and already by 1878 an Italian specialist by the name of Arrigo Tamassia could speak of "inversion of the sexual instinct," a designation that ultimately proved more popular than Westphal's formula.⁴³ But we should not be deceived by all this fervor of terminological innovation: despite the newfangled names, the condition that the doctors were busy constructing as a perverted orientation was essentially the same one that had been ascribed from time immemorial to the stigmatized figure of the *kinaidos* or *cinacrus*, the *mollis*, the "catamite," "pathic," "minion," or "molly."⁴⁴ It was this venerable category of "folk" belief that was reconstructed by means of the conceptual apparatus of modern sexology into a new scientific classification of sexual and gender deviance, a psychosexual orientation.

But sexual inversion, if it was indeed an orientation, still did not equate to homosexuality. "Contrary sexual feeling," for example, was intended to signify a sexual feeling contrary to the sex of the person who experienced it, that is, a feeling of belonging to a different sex from one's own *as well as* a feeling of erotic attraction at odds with the sex to which one belonged (because its object was a member of the same sex as oneself and because it expressed a masculine or feminine attitude proper to members of a sex different from one's own). Westphal, like many of his contemporaries, did not distinguish systematically between sexual deviance and gender deviance. Attraction to members of one's own sex indicated an identification with the opposite sex, and an identification with the opposite sex sometimes expressed itself as a feeling of sexual attraction to members of one's own sex. In this Westphal was reproducing the assumptions of his own culture, but he had also been influenced by the arguments of Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, the first political activist for homosexual emancipation, who in a series of writings composed from about 1862 on described his own condition as that of an *anima muliebris virili corpore inclusa*, a "woman's soul confined by a male body."⁴⁵

Similarly, the concept of sexual inversion treated same sex sexual desire and object choice as merely one of a number of pathological symptoms exhibited by those who reversed, or "inverted," the sex roles thought appropriate to their own sex: such symptoms, indicating masculine identification in women and feminine identification in men, comprised many different elements of personal style, ranging from the ideologically loaded (women who took an interest in politics and campaigned for the right to vote) to the trivial and bizarre (men who liked cats),⁴⁶ but the thread that linked them was sex role reversal or gender deviance. Sexual preference for a member of one's own sex was not clearly distinguished from other sorts of nonconformity to one's gender identity, as defined by prevailing cultural norms of manliness and womanliness. One implication of this model, which differentiates it strikingly from notions of homosexuality, is that the conventionally masculine and feminine same sex partners of inverts are not necessarily abnormal or problematic or deviant themselves: the straight identified male hustler or the fem who allows herself to be pleased by a butch is merely acting out a proper sexual scenario with an improper partner and may well be sexually normal in his or her own right.⁴⁷

If pederasty or sodomy was traditionally understood as a sexual preference without a sexual orientation, inversion was defined as a psychological orientation without a sexuality. In a footnote at the end of his article Westphal emphasized "the fact that 'contrary sexual feeling' does not always coincidentally concern the sexual drive as such but simply the feeling of being alienated, with one's entire inner being, from one's own sex—a less developed stage, as it were, of the pathological phenomenon."⁵⁰ For Westphal and his colleagues, "contrary sexual feeling" or sexual inversion was an essentially psychological condition of gender dysphoria that affected the inner life of the individual, an *orientation* not necessarily expressed in the performance or enjoyment of particular (homo)sexual acts. One of Westphal's star examples of "contrary sexual feeling" was in fact an individual who strictly avoided—or at least claimed to avoid—all sexual contact with members of his own sex and was diagnosed as suffering from "contrary sexual feeling" on the basis of his gender style alone, not on the basis of homosexual desire. This was one "Aug. Ha.," who had been arrested at a train station in Berlin in the winter of 1868 while wearing women's clothes. He had worked as a servant for several households, often wearing female attire and even owning fake breasts at some point; he had also stolen women's clothing and toiletries from his employers and had been imprisoned for using false identities. Westphal noted the "almost effeminate conduct of the patient, who speaks with a hisping voice in an effeminate tone" and whose ears bore traces of piercing. Anatomically, Aug. Ha. was hardly exotic: examination revealed strongly pubic hair up to the navel; the skin of the penis was strongly pigmented and wrinkled; the testicles were only of "moderate size"; and the anus showed "nothing special." More to the point, Ha. claimed that he "never let himself be used by men and never busted himself with them in a sexual way, even though many offers in this direction reached him." He had simply had a "drive" to dress up as a woman since he was eight years old. He had always had good relations with women and had gone out dancing with them while wearing women's clothes himself. He continued to occupy himself with needlework, embroidering cloths and manufacturing small women's hats, while under observation in the hospital.⁵¹

Sexual inversion, then, does not represent the same notion as homosexuality, because same-sex sexual object choice, or homosexual desire, is not essential to it: one can be inverted without being homosexual, and one can have homosexual sex, if one is a pederast or sodomite, without qualifying as sexually inverted. Hence, as Kinsey (who was versed in these concepts) insisted, "Inversion and homosexuality are two distinct and not always correlated types of behavior."⁵² Instead, the notions of "contrary sexual feeling" and sexual inversion seem to glance back at the long tradition of stigmatized male passivity, effeminacy, and gender deviance, which focuses less on homosexual sex or homosexual desire per se than on an accompanying lack of normative masculinity in one or both of the partners.⁵³

Now, at last, we come to homosexuality, a category whose peculiar and distinctive features and ramifications will, I hope, stand out more clearly in contrast to the four discursive traditions already discussed. The word "homosexuality" appeared in print for the first time in German in 1869, in two anonymous pamphlets published in Leipzig by an Austrian translator of Hungarian literature who took the name of Karl Maria Kerubeny. Although Kerubeny claimed publicly to be "sexually normal" himself, his term "homosexuality" can be considered an originally priggish coinage, insofar as Kerubeny used it in the course of an unsuccessful political campaign to prevent homosexual sex from being criminalized by the newly formed Federation of North German States.

Unlike "contrary sexual feeling," "sexual inversion," and "Uranian love," "homosexuality" was not coined to interpret the phenomenon it described or to attach a particular psychological or medical theory to it, and Kerubeny himself was vehemently opposed to a third-sex or inversion models of homosexual desire. "Homosexuality" simply referred to a sexual drive directed toward persons of the same sex as the sex of the person who was driven

by it. Indeed, it was the term's very minimalism, from a theoretical perspective, that made it so easily adaptable by later writers and theorists with a variety of ideological purposes. As a result, the term now condenses a number of different notions about same-sex sexual attraction as well as a number of different conceptual models for defining what homosexuality is.

Specifically, "homosexuality" absorbs and combines at least three distinct and previously uncorrelated concepts: (1) a psychiatric notion of perverted or pathological *orientation*, derived from Westphal and his nineteenth-century colleagues, which is an essentially psychological concept that applies to the inner life of the individual and does not necessarily presume same-sex sexual behavior; (2) a psychoanalytic notion of same-sex *sexual object choice* or *desire*, derived from Freud and his coworkers, which is a category of erotic intentionality and does not necessarily imply a permanent sexual orientation, let alone a deviant or pathological one (since, according to Freud, most normal individuals make an unconscious homosexual object choice at some point in their fantasy lives); and (3) a sociological notion of *sexually deviant behavior*, derived from nineteenth- and twentieth-century forensic inquiries into "social problems," which focuses on nonstandard sexual practice and does not necessarily refer to erotic psychology or sexual orientation (since same-sex sexual behavior, as Kinsey showed, is not the exclusive property of those with a homosexual sexual orientation, nor is it necessarily pathological, since it is widely represented in the population). So neither a notion of orientation, a notion of object choice, nor a notion of behavior alone is sufficient to generate the modern definition of "homosexuality"; rather, the notion seems to depend on the unstable conjunction of all three. "Homosexuality" is at once a psychological condition, an erotic desire, and a sexual practice (and those are three quite different things).

Furthermore, the very notion of homosexuality implies that same-sex sexual feeling and expression, in all their many forms, constitute a single thing, called "homosexuality," which can be thought of as a single integrated phenomenon, distinct and separate from "heterosexuality." "Homosexuality" refers to *all* same-sex sexual-desire and behavior, whether hierarchical or mutual, gender-polarized or ungendered, latent or actual, mental or physical.

The originality of "homosexuality" as a category and a concept appears more vividly in this light. Earlier discourses, whether of sodomy or inversion, referred to only one of the partners: the "active" partner in the case of sodomy, the effeminate male or masculine female in the case of inversion. The other partner, the one who was not motivated by sexual desire or who was not gender-deviant, did not qualify for inclusion in the category. "Homosexuality," by contrast, applies to *both* partners, whether active or passive, whether gendered normatively or deviantly. The hallmark of "homosexuality," in fact, is the refusal to distinguish between same-sex sexual partners or to rank them by treating one of them as more (or less) homosexual than the other.

Kinsey can be taken as representative of this modern outlook. Dismissing as "propaganda" the tendency of some men to define their own sexual identity according to a role-specific, prehomosexual model—to consider themselves straight because they only had fellatio performed on them by other men and never performed it themselves—Kinsey wrote that all "physical contacts with other males" that result in orgasm are "by any strict definition . . . homosexual."⁵⁴ According to Kinsey, in other words, it doesn't matter who sucks whom.

In this way homosexuality, both as a concept and as a social practice, significantly re-arranges and reinterprets earlier patterns of erotic organization, and as such it has an additional number of important practical consequences. First, under the aegis of homosexuality, the significance of gender and of gender roles for categorizing sexual acts and sexual actors fades.⁵⁵ So one effect of the concept of homosexuality is to detach sexual object choice from any necessary connection with gender identity, making it possible to ascribe homosexuality

to women and to men whose gender styles and outward appearance or manner are perfectly normative.

To be sure, this conceptual transformation has not been either total or absolute. Many people nowadays, both gay and nongay, continue to draw a direct connection between gender deviance and homosexuality. Despite the dominance of the categories of homosexuality and heterosexuality, "active" women and "passive" men, as well as effeminate men and masculine women, are still considered somehow *more homosexual* than other, less flamboyantly deviant persons who make homosexual object choices. Here we can discern the force with which earlier, prehomosexual sexual categories continue to exert their authority within the newer conceptual universe of homo- and heterosexuality. In some quarters it still matters a lot who sucks whom. Nonetheless, one effect of the modern homo-/heterosexual model has been to downplay the taxonomic significance of gender identities and sexual roles. Even the most asymmetrical behaviors can get trumped for the purposes of sexual classification by the sameness or difference of the sexes of the persons involved. Witness the anxiety expressed in the following anonymous letter to the sex advice columnist of an alternative newspaper:

I'm a 200 percent straight guy, married with children. About six months ago, I went to a masseur who finished things with a terrific blow job. If you wonder why I didn't stop him, the truth is, I couldn't, because he was massaging my asshole with his thumb while blowing me. It was so good that I've been going back to this guy just about every week, not for the massage but for the blow job. Now I'm starting to worry that this might label me as gay. I have no interest in blowing this guy, but I wonder if the guy who gets the blow job is as guilty as the one who does it.⁵⁶

The letter writer's worry is a direct effect of the emergent discourses of sexuality and of the recent changes in sexual classification that they have introduced. No such anxieties assail those as yet untouched by the discourses of sexuality.⁵⁷

The homo-/heterosexual model has other consequences. Homosexuality translates same-sex sexual relations into the register of sameness and mutuality. Homosexual relations no longer necessarily imply an asymmetry of social identities or sexual positions, nor are they inevitably articulated in terms of hierarchies of power, age, gender, or sexual role (which, again, is not to deny that such hierarchies may continue to function meaningfully in a lesbian or gay male context).⁵⁸ Homosexual relations are not necessarily lopsided in their distribution of erotic pleasure or desire. Rather, like that of heterosexual romantic love, the notion of homosexuality implies that it is possible for sexual partners to bond with one another not on the basis of their difference but on the basis of their sameness, their identity of desire and orientation and "sexuality." Homosexual relations cease to be compulsorily structured by a polarization of identities and roles (active/passive, insertive/receptive, masculine/feminine, or man/boy). Exclusive, lifelong, companionate, romantic, and mutual homosexual love becomes possible for both partners. Homosexual relations are not organized merely according to the requirements or prescriptions of large-scale social institutions, such as kinship systems, age classes, or initiation rituals; rather, they function as principles of social organization in their own right and give rise to freestanding social institutions.⁵⁹

Homosexuality is now set over against heterosexuality. Homosexual object choice, in and of itself, is seen as marking a difference from heterosexual object choice. Homo- and heterosexuality have become more or less mutually exclusive forms of human subjectivity, different kinds of human sexuality, and any feeling or expression of heterosexual desire is thought to rule out any feeling or expression of homosexual desire on the part of the same

individual. Sexual object choice attaches to a notion of sexual orientation, such that sexual behavior is seen to express an underlying and permanent psychosexual feature of the human subject. Hence people are routinely assigned to one or the other of two sexual species on the basis of their sexual object choice and orientation.

In short, homosexuality is more than same sex sexual object choice, more even than conscious erotic same sex preference. Homosexuality is the specification of same sex sexual object choice in and of itself as an overriding principle of sexual and social difference. Homosexuality is part of a new system of *sexuality*, which functions as a means of personal individuation: it assigns to each individual a sexual orientation and a sexual identity. As such, homosexuality introduces a novel element into social organization, into the social articulation of human difference, into the social production of desire, and ultimately into the social construction of the self.

It may be easier to grasp some of the overlapping and distinguishing features of our five discursive traditions in the history of (homo)sexual classification by consulting Table 1. As this schematic comparison indicates, each of the five traditions is irreducible to the others. I am not interested in defending the rightness or wrongness of the individual answers I have given to my own set of questions (I acknowledge that my answers are debatable); rather, I wish to show by the way my affirmatives and negatives are scattered across the chart that the patterns I have sketched do not reduce to a single coherent scheme.

One way to make sense of Table 16.1 is to note the radical difference between the final category ("homosexuality") and the four others. All of the first four traditional, postclassical, or premodern categories ("effeminacy," "pederasty/sodomy," "friendship/love," "passivity/inversion") depend crucially on notions of gender. This is obvious in the case of effeminacy and passivity/inversion, but it is also true of pederasty/sodomy and friendship/love, since they are defined by the male subject's embodiment and performance of traditionally masculine and masculinizing norms, just as effeminacy and passivity/inversion are defined by the male subject's violation of them. In premodern systems of sex and gender, the notion of "sexuality" is dispensable, because the regulation of conduct and social status is accomplished by the gender system alone. Of course, social status and class also contribute to the production of the first four categories. For example, effeminacy applies especially to those men who

Table 1 The five categories

	<i>Effeminacy</i>	<i>Sodomy</i>	<i>Friendship</i>	<i>Inversion</i>	<i>Homosexuality</i>
Is it an orientation?	No	Not really	No	Yes (?)	Yes
Does it involve gender deviance?	Yes	No (?)	No	Yes	Maybe
Does it involve same sex genital contact?	Not necessarily	Mostly	No	Sometimes	Mostly
Is it a sexual preference?	No	Sometimes	No	No	Yes
Does it represent a character type?	Yes	No (?)	No	Yes	Maybe
Does it involve homoerotic desire?	Sometimes	Yes, at least for one partner	Maybe	Sometimes	Yes
Does it classify women and men together?	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Is it constant across a sex or gender transition?	No	No	No	No	Maybe

are high enough in rank and status to be susceptible of suffering a loss or reduction in rank by comparing themselves at variance with the behavior expected of the elite. Friendship/love demands an equality of rank between the partners, whereas pederasty/sodomy depends on a socially significant difference between the partners in age, status, and sexual role. Passivity/inversion defines itself in relation to the gender hierarchy. With the arrival of homosexuality, the systems of difference that were internal to the structure of the previous four categories find themselves externalized and reconstituted at the border between homosexuality and heterosexualities, categories that now represent in and of themselves new strategies of social differentiation and regulation. The homo/hetero categories function not to maintain an already existing hierarchy of gender and status but to manage, by differentiating and disciplining, unranked masses of notionally identical "individuals." One name for this technique of governing individuals en masse is *normalization*.⁶⁰

Perhaps the final irony in all this is that the very word *sex*, which itself may derive from the Latin *secare*, "to cut or divide," and which originally signified the sharpness and cleanness of the division between the natural categories of male and female, has had the fine edge of its meaning so blunted by the historical shifts and rearrangements in our conceptual maps of sexual life that it now represents what is most resistant to clear classification, discrimination, and division.

Notes

The title of my essay pays tribute to the work of Arnold I. Davidson, which has consistently, enduringly, and powerfully shaped my own: see, especially, his essays "How to Do the History of Psychoanalysis: A Reading of Freud's *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*," *Critical Inquiry* 13 (1986-87): 252-77; "Sex and the Emergence of Sexuality," *Critical Inquiry* 14 (1987-88): 16-48; and "Closing Up the Corpses: Diseases of Sexuality and the Emergence of the Psychiatric Style of Reasoning," in *Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam*, ed. George Boolos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 295-325. In my recent work on the history of sexuality, particularly in this essay and in "Forgetting Foucault: Acts, Identities, and the History of Sexuality," *Representations* 63 (1998): 93-120, I have returned to a set of issues that Davidson's work first opened up for me and that I have pondered for well over a decade now. This essay represents the first installment of what I hope will be a larger project.

Many people have touched on in this essay: I cannot list all their names here, as I would like to do. But I must thank Patricia Crawford and Hilary Fraser, who invited me to participate in their Australian Academy of the Social Sciences Workshop "Gender, Sexualities, and Historical Change," University of Western Australia, 31 July-1 August 1998. Discussions among members of that workshop provided the immediate stimulus for this essay. I owe a particular debt in this regard to Judith M. Bennett. This essay was written for delivery at the conference "Sex and Conflict: Gay and Lesbian Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences," Lund University, 9-10 October 1998. I wish to thank Eva Osterberg and Johanna Esseveld for giving me that opportunity to present my work and Martha Vicinus and Lillian Faderman, my fellow participants, for encouraging me to persevere with it.

Finally, I would like to thank George E. Haggerty, whose work and conversation originally prompted me to broach some of these ideas. See now his *Men in Love: Masculinity and Sexuality in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), which offers a refreshingly different solution from the one proposed here to a material question about how to do the history of male homosexuality.

Some of the material and the argumentation presented here also appear in my entry "Sex, Sexuality, Sexual Classification," in *Critical Terms for Gender Studies*, eds. Catharine Stimpson and Gilbert Herdt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

1 See, e.g., Jacqueline Murray, "Twice Marginal and Twice Invisible: Lesbians in the Middle Ages," in *Handbook of Medieval Sexuality*, eds. Vern L. Bullough and James A. Brundage (London: Garland, 1996), 191-222; or the otherwise excellent article by Anna Clark, "Anne Lister's Construction of Lesbian Identity," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 7 (1996): 23-50.

2 Or so I argue in "Historicizing the Subject of Desire: Sexual Preferences and Erotic Identities in the Pseudo-Lucianic *Esos*," in *Foucault and the Writing of History*, ed. Jan Goldstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 19-34, 255-61; and in "Forgetting Foucault." For a quite different but powerful

- and persuasive argument for the importance of emphasizing continuities in women's history see Judith M. Bennett, "Confronting Continuity," *Journal of Women's History* 9, no. 3 (1997): 73–94.
- 3 The demonstration of the existence of such an irreducible definitional uncertainty is the central, invaluable accomplishment of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Epistemology of the Closet* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). As will become evident, I have taken on board her critique (45–48) of my earlier work, *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality and Other Essays on Greek Love* (New York: Routledge, 1990), applying her lesson about the irresolvable contradictions in what we are too quick to call "homosexuality as we understand it today." At the same time, however, I will continue to insist on documenting the existence of what she terms, sarcastically, "a Great Paradigm Shift" in the history of homosexuality, namely, the emergence of the discourses of homosexuality themselves in the modern period. Far from seeing a conflict between a historical inquiry into the construction of homosexuality and a discursive analysis of the contradictions in the modern notion of homosexuality, I see such a historical inquiry as helping account for the ineradicable incoherence of the modern notion. Sedgwick's own work, in fact, has enabled me to bring the historical and discursive critiques of homosexuality into closer and more systematic alignment.
 - 4 Martin Bauml Duberman, Martha Vicinus, and George Chauncey Jr., eds., *Hidden from History: Reclaiming the Gay and Lesbian Past* (New York: New American Library, 1989), 8.
 - 5 See Randolph Trumbach, "London's Sodomites: Homosexual Behavior and Western Culture in the Eighteenth Century," *Journal of Social History* 11 (1977): 1–33; Barry D. Adam, "Age, Structure, and Sexuality: Reflections on the Anthropological Evidence on Homosexual Relations," in *Anthropology and Homosexual Behavior*, ed. Evelyn Blackwood (New York: Haworth, 1986), 19–33; Adam, "Structural Foundations of the Gay World," in *Queer Theory/Sociology*, ed. Steven Seidman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 111–26; and David F. Greenberg, *The Construction of Homosexuality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 25. Greenberg speaks of "transgenderal," "transgenerational," and "egalitarian" types (the last two terms are, in my view, misleading).
 - 6 Sedgwick, *Epistemology of the Closet*, 47.
 - 7 There is a striking irony—no less striking for its having gone, so far as I know, totally unnoticed—in the section of *Epistemology of the Closet* in which Sedgwick justly criticizes social constructionist historians of homosexuality because, to call attention to the differences between premodern and modern forms of homosexual expression, they typically draw a sharp contrast between earlier sexual categories and a falsely coherent, homogeneous, and unitary notion of "homosexuality as we understand it today," thereby treating the contemporary concept of homosexuality as "a coherent definitional field rather than a space of overlapping, contradictory, and conflictual definitional forces" (45). Sedgwick argues that it is wrong to suppose that earlier sexual categories are simply superseded or wholly replaced by later ones. Rather, she suggests, earlier sexual categories continue to reappear within later ones, producing an ineradicable instability in those later categories. Moreover, she produces an analysis of homosexual discourse in terms of what she regards as a well nigh perennial tension among and between four definitional axes: minoritizing/universalizing modes of homosexual definition and gender-transitive versus gender-intransitive or gender-separatist modes of homosexual definition. By that means Sedgwick aims "to denarrativize" the narratives written by social constructionist historians (including, explicitly, myself) by "focusing on a performative space of contradiction" (48). Although I have embraced Sedgwick's critique, as will be evident from this essay, I find it noteworthy that Sedgwick herself seems to ignore her own lesson in the very act of preaching it. For she announces that her intention is to end the essentialist constructionist debate, "to promote [its] obsolescence" (40). In this she has been largely successful. As Ross Chambers observes in a superb commentary on this very passage in Sedgwick, "Without quite putting an end to the essentialist constructionist debate, Sedgwick's move has effectively backgrounded it, and allowed an ongoing conversation to bracket it out by, as it were, changing the subject" ("Strategic Constructivism? Sedgwick's Ethics of Inversion," in *Regarding Sedgwick: Essays in Queer Culture and Critical Theory*, eds. Stephen Barber and David L. Clark [New York: Routledge, 2002]). In other words, Sedgwick deliberately sets aside historical questions about the emergence of modern sexual categories and describes these questions as effectively superseded by her own approach; in a gesture exactly congruent with the one she criticizes, she structures her project in such a way that "the superseded model then drops out of the frame of analysis" (47). But just as the discourses of sodomy or inversion do not disappear with the emergence of the discourses of homosexuality, as Sedgwick rightly argues, so the historical problem of describing the differences between prehomosexual and homosexual formations will not simply disappear with a heightened awareness of the crisis of homo- and heterosexual definition in the present. It is now my turn to insist, against Sedgwick, on her very own axiom: despite her dazzling and important demonstration of the futility of playing the truth game called the essentialist constructionist debate, the terms of that debate have not been superseded for historians by Sedgwick's

- "focusing on [homo-heterosexual definition] as performative space of contradiction." Rather than attempt to reassert the terms of the essentialist constructionist debate in opposition to Sedgwick, however, I try here to reanimate the constructionist historical project in a more self-aware and theoretical spirit, so as to bring the Foucauldian historical and narrativist critique of homosexual essentialism into greater harmony with the denarrativizing and performative critique advocated by Sedgwick.
- 8 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley, 3 vols. (New York: Pantheon, 1978-86), 1:101.
- 9 Rosemary Daniell, *Sleeping with Soldiers: In Search of the Macho Man* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1984), 71.
- 10 Pseudo Lucian, *Exiles 9*, trans. M. D. MacLeod, in *Lucian VIII* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967). See, generally, Halperin, "Historicizing the Subject of Desire."
- 11 Chariton, *Chaeris and Callirhoe 1.4*, trans. B. P. Reardon, in *Collected Ancient Greek Novels*, ed. B. P. Reardon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 27. Similarly, Artemidorus observes that men who dream that they wear facial makeup, jewelry, or unguents will suffer disgrace (i.e., will be exposed) as adulterers; see 81.15-17, 106.16-107.2, and 269.11-13 Pack, cited with discussion by Suzanne MacMabister, "Gender as Sign and Symbolism in Artemidoros' *Oneirokritika*: Social Aspirations and Anxieties," *Helios* 19 (1992): 140-60, esp. 149-50. Cf. the representations of Agathon in Old Comedy: commentary by Froma I. Zeitlin, "Travesties of Gender and Genre in Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazuse*," in *Playing the Other: Gender and Society in Classical Greek Literature* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 375-416; Frances Muecke, "A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Woman," *Classical Quarterly* 32 (1982): 41-55.
- 12 See Nicole Loraux, "Heraclès: The Super-Male and the Feminine," trans. Robert Lamberton, in *Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World*, eds. David M. Halperin, John J. Winkler, and Froma I. Zeitlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 21-52.
- 13 See Stephen Orgel, *Impossibilities: The Performance of Gender in Shakespeare's England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 25-26. I wish to thank Vernon Rosario for suggesting the humorous gloss on this passage. See also Joseph Cady, "The 'Masculine Love' of the 'Princes of Sodom' Practising the Art of Ganymede' at Henri III's Court: The Homosexuality of Henri III and His *Mignons* in Pierre de L'Estoile's *Memoires journaliers*," in *Desire and Discipline: Sex and Sexuality in the Renaissance*, eds. Jacqueline Murray and Konrad Eisenbichler (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 123-54, esp. 132-33; "However, in the Renaissance the word 'effeminate,' when applied to a man, did not automatically connote homosexuality, but instead had a diversity of meaning it lacks today. For instance, the term sometimes designated a kind of hyper or helpless male heterosexuality, a usage that, of course, no longer exists. Donne's remark that he is called 'effeminate' because he [love]s women joys, in his epigram 'The Jughiter' (1587-1596), belongs to this Renaissance tradition." For further details Cady refers the reader to his earlier essay "Renaissance Awareness and Language for Heterosexuality: 'Love' and 'Feminine Love,'" in *Renaissance Discourses of Desire*, ed. Claude J. Summers and Ted Larry Pedworth (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1993), 143-58.
- 14 Quoted by Davidson, "Closing Up the Corpses," 315.
- 15 See Randolph Trumbach, "The Birth of the Queen: Sodomy and the Emergence of Gender Equality in Modern Culture, 1660-1750," in Duberman, Vicinus, and Chauncey, *Hidden from History*, 129-40, 509-11.
- 16 I follow here the arguments of Davidson, "Closing Up the Corpses"; and George Chauncey Jr., "From Sexual Inversion to Homosexuality: Medicine and the Changing Conceptualization of Female Deviance," in *Fashion and Power: Sexuality in History*, eds. Kathy Peiss and Christina Simmons, with Robert A. Padgug (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 87-117.
- 17 See, for some recent examples, Thorkil Vanggaard, *Phallos: A Symbol and Its History in the Male World*, trans. from the Danish by the author (New York: International Universities Press, 1972), 17 and passim; Lionel Ovesey, *Homosexuality and Pseudohomosexuality* (New York: Science House, 1969); and Richard A. Posner, *Sex and Reason* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), esp. 105-7, 152, 296.
- 18 E.g., Gary W. Dowsett, *Practicing Desire: Homosexual Sex in the Era of AIDS* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).
- 19 See Robert B. Koehl, "The Chieftain Cup and a Minoan Rite of Passage," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 106 (1986): 99-110; and Koehl, "Ephoros and Ritualized Homosexuality in Bronze Age Crete," in *Queer Representations: Reading Lives, Reading Cultures*, eds. Martin Duberman (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 7-13.
- 20 Michael Roche, *Forbidden Friendships: Homosexuality and Male Culture in Renaissance Florence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 4, 96-97.

- 21 Thus, for example, the fourteenth and fifteenth-century Florentine definitions of "sodomy" and "sodomite" refer to the "active" or insertive partner in anal intercourse only (*ibid.*, 14, 110).
- 22 See Halperin, *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality*, 163 n. 53, for an admittedly incomplete list.
- 23 See Halperin, "Historicizing the Subject of Desire," esp. 24–25, 257–58 nn. 30–32; also Everett K. Rowson, "The Categorization of Gender and Sexual Irregularity in Medieval Arabic Vice Lists," in *Body Guards: The Cultural Politics of Gender Ambiguity*, eds. Julia Epstein and Kristina Straub (New York: Routledge, 1991), 50–79; and J. W. Wright and Everett K. Rowson, eds., *Homocriticism in Classical Arabic Literature* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
- 24 See Cynthia B. Herrup, *A House in Gross Disorder: Sex, Law, and the Second Earl of Castlehaven* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 33: "The prosecutions for sodomy about which we have information before the late seventeenth century rarely condemned defendants for effeminate behavior; conversely, reproaches for effeminacy rarely included sexual examples."
- 25 John Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 44.
- 26 For an attempt to document several instances of same-sex sexual object choice, and even of conscious erotic preferences for persons of the same sex as oneself, that nonetheless do not satisfy the criteria for homosexuality, see Halperin, "Historicizing the Subject of Desire."
- 27 See Halperin, "Heroes and Their Pals," in *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality*, 75–87, 176–79.
- 28 See Alan Bray, "Homosexuality and the Signs of Male Friendship in Elizabethan England," in *Queering the Renaissance*, ed. Jonathan Goldberg (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 40–61. I interpret Bray to provide evidence for this claim, although he does not quite make it himself. See also Herrup, *A House in Gross Disorder*, 33: "Whether or not actually pederastic, the sodomitical relationships described in the legal records invariably paired authority and dependency—men and boys, masters and servants, teachers and pupils, patrons and clients."
- 29 *The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 139.
- 30 *Ibid.*, 139–40.
- 31 I owe this citation to Haggerty, *Men in Love*, 25, who interprets it eloquently but almost exactly contrary to the way I do. For a contrasting approach to this topic see C. Stephen Jaeger, *Ennobling Love: In Search of a Lost Sensibility* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999).
- 32 I overstate for the sake of emphasis. For a more nuanced and complex account of the interrelations of sexuality and gender in transgenderism see Don Kulick, *Travesti: Sex, Gender, and Culture among Brazilian Transgendered Prostitutes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
- 33 See Sedgwick, *Epistemology of the Closet*, esp. 1, 9, 85–86, whence I derive the distinction between "universalizing" and "minoritizing" constructions of sexual identity.
- 34 For a more detailed contrast between the invert and the sodomite as discursive types see Halperin, "Forgetting Foucault."
- 35 Cited and translated by Maud W. Gleason, *Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 68.
- 36 Quintilian, *Institutes* 5.9.14, cited and translated by Amy Richlin, "Not before Homosexuality: The Materiality of the *Cinaedus* and the Roman Law against Love between Men," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 3 (1992–93): 542.
- 37 This is a composite passage by ancient physiognomic writers, assembled by Gleason, *Making Men*, 63.
- 38 Another composite passage, *ibid.*, 78.
- 39 Aulus Gellius, 6.12.5, cited and translated by Craig A. Williams, *Roman Homosexuality: Ideologies of Masculinity in Classical Antiquity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 23. A measure of the distance between inversion or passivity and male love can be gauged from the fact that Scipio was quite willing to identify himself publicly as bound to his friend Laelius by a "bond of love," according to the Roman historian Valerius Maximus (8.8.1). (I wish to thank Tom Hillard of Macquarie University for this observation and citation.) There would not necessarily have been any inconsistency or hypocrisy in Scipio's attitude.
- 40 *Historia ecclesiastica* 8.10, cited and translated by Glenn W. Oksen, "St. Anselm and Homosexuality," in *Proceedings of the Fifth International Saint Anselm Conference: St. Anselm and St. Augustine, Episcopi ad Saecula*, ed. Joseph C. Schnaubelt et al. (White Plains, N.Y.: Kraus, 1988), 110. Note that nothing in this passage establishes that the "effeminate" excoriated in it are being condemned specifically for sexual passivity (although the use of the word *catamite* clearly points in that direction). It would be easy enough for an incautious (or essentialist) historian to construe Orderic's reference to "the filth of sodomy" as implying the opposite, namely, that the "effeminate" are also being accused of playing an "active" role in homosexual intercourse. There is plainly no way to settle the question definitively.

but I hope that the historical typology I am constructing here will help resolve such ambiguities and will aid in the decipherment of historical texts. In Ordric's case, the text's insistence on the visible deviance of the castrates, its ascription to them of an effeminate morphology, situates it in a discursive tradition considerably more specific than that of merely "gay male representation." Instead, Ordric's account would seem to belong to a particular European tradition of discourse, a particular mode of representing male invert or passives. The more we know about the discursive rules and regularities that control the production of statements about historical sexual actors, the easier it may be to figure out what is going on in particular passages even in the absence of explicit linguistic indications. In this way, attentiveness to the discursive context of Ordric's text makes it possible, I believe, to extract from his ambiguous and indeterminate language a better idea of the transgression for which the "effeminate" are being condemned than we could ever do on the basis of his words alone.

41 Cited and translated (with slight alterations here) by Cady, "Masculine Love" of the 'Princes of Sodom,'" 133. Cady, of course, draws a different conclusion about the existence of homosexuality in the Renaissance from this and other comments by Pierre de l'Estoile.

42 The two passages are cited and quoted by Alan Bray, *Homosexuality in Renaissance England* (London: Gay Men's, 1982), 81, 87.

43 Quoted and discussed by Lisa L. Moore, *Dangerous Intimates: Toward a Sapphic History of the British Novel* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 72-74.

44 C. Westphal, "Die konträre Sexualempfindung, Symptom eines neuropathischen (psychopathischen) Zustandes," *Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten* 2 (1870): 73-108.

45 Arrigo Tamassia, "Sull' 'Inversione dell' istmo sessuale,'" *Rivista sperimentale di fisiologia e di medicina legale* 4 (1878): 97-117.

46 Of course, the molly himself is a complex figure, already verging on the homosexual, as Tumbach and others have shown. I do not mean to skip over the vexed interpretive issues, merely to make the point that the figure of the molly—however forward looking he may be in other respects—retains many of the features traditionally ascribed to male invert or passives.

47 The basic study is Hubert Kennedy, *Whicks: The Life and Works of Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, Pioneer of the Modern Gay Movement* (Boston: Alyson, 1988).

48 See Chauncey, "From Sexual Inversion to Homosexuality."

49 My account derives from Chauncey, *ibid.*

50 Westphal, "Die konträre Sexualempfindung," 107 n; my emphasis.

51 Westphal, "Die konträre Sexualempfindung," 82-84, cited, translated, and discussed by Robert Grimm, "The Dawn of Contrary Sexual Sensitivity," unpublished manuscript.

52 Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell B. Pomeroy, and Clyde E. Martin, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (Philadelphia: Saunders, 1948), 615. For a detailed elaboration of the distinction between homo-

sexuality and inversion see C.A. Tripp, *The Homosexual Matrix* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), 22-35.

53 In this one respect, at least, Kinsey proves a more reliable historian than Foucault. In *The History of Sexuality* Foucault dated the birth of homosexuality (as a discursive category) to Westphal's article: "We must not forget that the psychological, psychiatric, medical category of homosexuality was constituted from the moment it was characterized—Westphal's famous article of 1870 on 'contrary sexual sensations' can stand as its date of birth—less by a type of sexual relations than by a certain quality of sexual sensibility, a certain way of inverting the masculine and the feminine in oneself. Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphroditism of the soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species" (1:43). I believe Foucault was right to see in Westphal the emergence of a modern psychiatric notion of erotic orientation, which brought with it a specification of deviant individuals and a shift from a juridical discourse of prohibited acts to a normalizing discourse of perceived psychology. But I also believe Foucault was wrong to identify Westphal's category of "contrary sexual feeling" with homosexuality. In *Epistemology of the Closet* Sedgwick ingeniously argued that my "reading of 'homosexuality' as 'we currently understand it' . . . is virtually the opposite of Foucault's," insofar as Foucault has a "gender transitive" understanding of homosexuality, whereas I have a "gender intransitive" one (46). That may well explain why Foucault did not take what I regard as the historically necessary step of systematically differentiating "sexual inversion" from "homosexuality." Still, the ultimate issue here may not be a difference of opinion about what homosexuality is so much as an uncertainty about whether it is possible to draw a meaningful distinction in the history of modern European discourses between an "orientation" and a "sexuality."

54 Kinsey, Pomeroy, and Martin, *Sexual Behavior*, 616, 623.

- 55 The aptly chosen word *fades* here derives from Adam, who writes that in homosexuality "sex role definitions fade from interpersonal bonding" ("Structural Foundations," 111). This paragraph and much of what follows have been inspired by Adam.
- 56 Quoted by Dan Savage, *Savage Love: Straight Answers from America's Most Popular Sex Columnist* (New York: Plume, 1998), 189-90.
- 57 See, in addition to Kinsey, Pomeroy, and Martin, *Sexual Behavior*, the following: George Chauncey Jr., "Christian Brotherhood or Sexual Perversion? Homosexual Identities and the Construction of Sexual Boundaries in the World War One Era," in Duberman, Vicinus, and Chauncey, *Hidden from History*, 294-317, 541-46; and Michael Bartos, John McLeod, and Phil Nott, *Meanings of Sex between Men: A Study Conducted by the Australian Federation of AIDS Organisations for the Commonwealth Department of Human Services and Health, 1993* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994).
- 58 See Barry D. Adam, "Age Preferences among Gay and Bisexual Men," *GLQ* 6 (2000): 413-33.
- 59 See, once again, Adam, "Structural Foundations."
- 60 See Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979), 182-84:

"In short, under a regime of disciplinary power, the art of punishing . . . brings five quite distinct operations into play: it refers individual acts, performances, and conducts to a group ensemble that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation, and a source of the rule to be followed. It differentiates individuals in relation to one another and in terms of that group rule, whether the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be looked to, or as an optimum to be approximated. It measures in quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms of value the abilities, the level of attainment, and the 'nature' of individuals. It imposes, through this 'valorizing' measurement, the constraint of a conformity to be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that will define difference in relation to all other differences, the external frontier of the abnormal. . . . [To recapitulate, it] compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In a word, it normalizes. . . . Like surveillance and together with it, normalization becomes one of the great instruments of power at the end of the classical age. The marks that once indicated status, privilege, and group membership come to be replaced, or at least to be supplemented, by a whole range of degrees of normality: these are signs of membership in a homogeneous social body, but they also play a part themselves in classification, in hierarchization, and in the distribution of ranks. In one sense, the power of normalization enforces homogeneity, but it individualizes by making it possible to measure deviations, to set levels, to define specialties, and to render differences useful by calibrating them one to another. The power of the norm functions easily within a system of formal equality, since within a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm introduces, as a useful imperative and as the result of measurement, all the gradations of individual differences."

Translation extensively modified.

Lee Edelman

THE FUTURE IS KID STUFF: QUEER THEORY, DISIDENTIFICATION, AND THE DEATH DRIVE

Lee Edelman is the Fletcher Professor of English Literature and Chair of the English Department at Tufts University. A key figure in the dissemination of queer theory, Edelman's publications include *Homographesis: Essays in Gay Literary and Cultural Theory* (1993) and *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive* (2004). His work examines the intersections of sexuality, rhetorical theory, cultural politics, and film.

In "The Future is Kid Stuff," originally published in *Narrative*, Edelman explores the ways in which notions of political futurity are shaped by the image of the child. Using a Lacanian framework, Edelman suggests that the image of the child in political discourse functions to uphold reproductive futurism, which demands the endless deferment of *jouissance* and an ethics that privileges heteronormativity. This discursive framework defines queer identities as embodiments of the death drive. Edelman interrogates the politics that promote the child as a figure of universal value and explores how this trope (and the symbolic order that produces it) can be potentially disputed through a strategic deployment of queer sexualities and queer oppositional politics. Specifically, Edelman argues that queer subjects should embrace political negativity through the role of the *sinthomosexual*, a figure that actively disrupts social order through a rejection of reproductive futurity and progressive politics.

A TLOW ME, BY way of introduction, to call your attention to a recent, minor, and short-lived political controversy, one that citizens of the United States have been rightly unwilling to fret about amid all the other incidents by which the press would have us be scandalized. According to an article in the *New York Times*, a series of public service announcements featuring President and Mrs. Clinton and sponsored by the Ad Council, a nonprofit organization, have "raise[d] questions about where politics stops and public service begins"